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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to two different plea agreements covering four different cases, 
Curtis Hartshorn pled guilty to one count each of: delivery of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), escape, issuing a check without sufficient funds, and grand theft. 
When all was said and done, Mr. Hartshorn was left with an aggregate prison sentence 
of at least four, but no more than twelve, years. After being sentenced, Mr. Hartshorn 
filed a motion for a sentence reduction, pursuant to Idaho criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter 
Rule 35 motion), as to each of the four offenses, as well as a motion to withdraw his 
plea of guilty to the grand theft charge. Those motions were all denied. 
On appeal, Mr. Hartshorn contends that the district court denied him his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea where defense counsel was not present. He further contends that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motions. Mr. Hartshorn respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea to the grand theft charge, and that it remand his case for a new hearing 
on that motion. In addition, he requests that this Court reduce his sentences. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
On March 24, 2006, Curtis Hartshorn was charged with a single count of delivery 
of methamphetamine for having sold drugs to a confidential informant almost two years 
earlier. (Drug Case R., pp.6-7; see also Drug Case R., p.24 (Information); PSI, p.2 
(providing Mr. Hartshorn's explanation of the crime).)' Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Mr. Hartshorn pled guilty to the amended charge of possession of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver. (Drug Case R., pp.17-21.) In exchange, the State dismissed 
four unrelated cases and agreed that if the pre-sentence investigator recommended 
retained jurisdiction, it would make the same recommendation. (Drug Case R., pp.17- 
21 (written plea agreement), 22-23 (change of plea minutes).) Ultimately, the district 
court imposed a sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, but suspended that 
sentence and placed Mr. Hartshorn on probation for five years. (Drug Case R., pp.43- 
45 (sentencing hearing minutes), 46-52 (judgment of conviction); Drug Case Tr., p.14, 
Ls.20-25.) As a condition of probation, Mr. Hartshorn was required to serve 60 days in 
the county jail, during which time he would be allowed work release. (Drug Case R., 
pp.44, 47; Drug Case Tr., p.15, Ls.4-8.) 
' This consolidated appeal includes four different cases: No. 33914 (hereinafter "Drug 
Case"); No. 33915 (hereinaffer "Escape Case"); No. 339$6 (hereinafter "Bad Check 
Case"); and 33917 (hereinafter "Grand Theft Case"). Because there are four cases, 
there are also four Clerk's Records, which are referenced herein as "Drug Case R.," 
"Escape Case R.," "Bad Check Case R.," and "Grand Theft Case R.," as appropriate. 
Among the four cases, there are six separately-bound transcripts. Three of those six 
transcripts (labeled by case number and including Nos. 33915 (Escape Case), 33916 
(Bad Check Case), and 33917 (Grand Theft Case)) are identical in that they all contain 
the transcription of Mr. Hartshorn's December 4, 2006, change of plea hearing, and his 
December 18, 2006, sentencing hearing. Thus, only one of those three transcripts is 
cited herein-the one labeled with No. 33915 (Escape Case)-and ail citations to that 
transcript are provided as "Escape Case Tr." In addition, the transcript labeled with 
No. 33914 (Drug Case), and containing the transcription of Mr. Hartshorn's August 7, 
2006, sentencing hearing and his December 18, 2006, probation violation disposition 
hearing is also cited herein. Citations to that transcript are provided as "Drug Case Tr." 
Finally, there are two transcripts which are labeled with all four case numbers. Of these 
two additional transcripts, the one containing the transcription of the February 12, 2008, 
hearing on Mr. Hartshorn's motion to withdraw his plea is referenced herein as 
"Withdrawal of Plea Tr.," and the one containing the transcription of the January 22, 
2007, proceedings relating to Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 motion and the State's restitution 
request is referenced as "Rule 35 Tr." 
On or about August 9, 2006, two days after he was sentenced in the Drug Case, 
Mr. Hartshorn left the county jail on work release and failed to return. (Escape Case Tr., 
p.13, L.21 - p.14, L.4.) The following day, he was charged with escape (Escape Case 
R., pp.4-5; see also Escape Case R., pp.19-20 (Information)) and a warrant was issued 
for his arrest (see Escape Case R., p.1 (district court's register of actions)) in the 
Escape Case. Apparently, he was not arrested on that warrant until October 26, 2006. 
(See Escape Case R., p.1 (register of actions showing that the warrant was returned on 
October 26, 2006, and that Mr. Hartshorn was arraigned the following day).) 
In the meantime, on September 25, 2006, Mr. Hartshorn was charged in a 
separate case (the Bad Check Case) with four counts of issuing a check without funds 
for allegedly writing four bad checks after he had absconded from work release. (Bad 
Check Case R., pp.4-5; see also Bad Check Case R., pp.21-22 (Information).) 
On October 26, 2006, the day Mr. Hartshorn was re-arrested, he allegedly took, 
obtained or withheld a financial transaction card and, later, while being arrested, 
allegedly attempted to commit a violent injury on one of the arresting officers. (See 
Grand Theft Case R., pp.4-5 (November 8, 2006, complaint alleging grand theft and 
aggravated assault); Drug Case Tr., p.23, Ls.2-8 (prosecutor's contention that 
Mr. Hartshorn approached the arresting officers in a threatening manner while holding a 
heavy steel cable).) Thus, he was subsequently charged in another separate case (the 
Grand Theft Case) with grand theft and aggravated assault. (Grand Theft R., pp.4-5; 
see also Grand Theft Case R., p.21 (Information).) 
On or about November 27, 2006, Mr. Hartshorn entered into a plea agreement 
addressing his three new cases-the Escape Case, the Bad Check Case, and the 
Grand Theft Case. Under the terms of that agreement, Mr. Hartshorn was to plead 
guilty to: escape in the Escape Case, one count of issuing a check without funds in the 
Bad Check Case, and grand theft in the Grand Theft Case; in exchange, the State 
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges (three counts of issuing a check without funds 
in the Bad Check Case and one count of aggravated assault in the Grand Theft Case) 
and recommend a sentence of six months fixed in the Escape Case, that sentence to 
run consecutively to the sentence in the Drug Case, and sentences in the Bad Check 
Case and the Grand Theft Case which run concurrently with the sentence in the Drug 
Case. (Escape Case R., pp.14-18; Bad Check Case R., pp.14-18; Grand Theft Case 
R., pp.14-18.) Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Mr. Hartshorn changed his 
pleas in open court on December 4, 2006. (Escape Case R., pp.21-23; Bad Check 
Case R., pp.28-30; Grand Theft Case R., pp.27-29; Escape Case Tr., p.5, L.l - p.18, 
L.15.) Notably, in the Grand Theft Case only, Mr. Hartshorn entered an ~l ford'  plea 
because, with regard to the grand theft charge, he maintained that he believed that he 
had authorization from the owner of the financial transaction card in question to use that 
card. (SeeEscapeCaseTr.,p.15, L.15-p.17, L.12.) 
On or about December 7, 2006, Mr. Hartshorn sent the district court a letter 
stating, in relevant part, as follows: 
I have a problem with pleading guilty to something I didn't do. I feel 
like I was forced to do that. The prosecutor told me [that] if I didn't though, 
the enhancement would be filed and the persistent violator also. That is a 
threat no matter how you slice it. 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)rAn individual accused of crime may 
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison 
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts 
constituting the crime."). 
I want to retract my guilty pleas starting with [the Drug Case, the 
Grand Theft Case, the Bad Check Case, and the Escape Case]. 
(Letter to Mr. Stafford, Judge St. Clair & Prosecutor, from Curtis Hartshorn (filed Dec. 7, 
2006))~ The district court construed Mr. Hartshorn's letter as a motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. (See Escape Case Tr., p.19, Ls.11-12.) Mr. Hartshorn's letter also 
requested that he be allowed to proceed pro se. (Letter to Mr. Stafford, Judge St. Clair 
& Prosecutor, from Curtis Hartshorn (filed Dec. 7, 2006)) 
On December 18, 2006, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Hartshorn's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. (See Escape Case Tr., p.19, L . l  - p.21, L.21.) 
However, at the outset of that hearing, Mr. Hartshorn, acting through his counsel of 
r e ~ o r d , ~  agreed to withdraw his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas if he could be 
sentenced in the Escape Case, the Grand Theft Case, and the Bad Check Case 
immediately. (See Escape Case Tr., p.19, L.1 - p.21, L.21.) The prosecutor and the 
district court agreed, and the December 18, 2006, hearing evolved into a sentencing 
hearing. (See generally Escape Case Tr., p.19, L.l - p.30, L.18.) 
During the sentencing portion of the December 18, 2006, hearing, the district 
court addressed all four of Mr. Hartshorn's cases. (See generally Drug Case R., pp.57- 
59; Escape Case R., pp.25-27; Bad Check Case R., pp.36-38; Grand Theft Case R., 
pp.37-39; Escape Case Tr., p.19, L. l  - p.30, L.18.) With regard to the Drug Case, the 
district court revoked Mr. Hartshorn's probation and ordered his original sentence of ten 
The letter is appended to Mr. Hartshorn's October 1, 2007, Motion to Withdraw Alford 
Plea as Attachment. The October 1, 2007, Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea is attached 
to Mr. Hartshorn's Motion to Augment Record, which is filed concurrently herewith. 
At the December 18, 2006, hearing, there was absolutely no mention of 
Mr. Hartshorn's request to represent himself. Indeed, as noted, Mr. Hartshorn was 
represented by his counsel of record at that hearing. (See generally Escape Case Tr., 
p.19, L.1 -p.30, L.18.) 
years, with three years fixed, into execution. (Drug Case R., pp.59, 60-61; Escape 
Case Tr., p.27, Ls.21-23.) With regard to the Escape Case, the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of one year, all fixed, and it ordered that sentence to run consecutively 
to the sentence in the Drug Case. (Escape Case R., pp.26, 28-29; Escape Case Tr., 
p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.2.) With regard to the Bad Check Case, the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of three years, all fixed, and ordered that sentence to run concurrently 
with the sentence in the Drug Case. (Bad Check Case R., pp.37-38, 39-40; Escape 
Case Tr., p.28, Ls.2-12.) Finally, with regard to the Grand Theft Case, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with four years fixed, and ordered that 
sentence to run concurrently with the sentence in the Drug Case. (Grand Theft Case 
R., pp.39, 40-41; Escape Case Tr., p.28, Ls.13-18.) In the aggregate, all of this means 
that Mr. Hartshorn is presently set to serve at least four, but no more than twelve, years. 
The district court entered orders memorializing its decisions in the four cases the 
following day. (Drug Case R., pp.60-62; Escape Case R., pp.28-30; Bad Check Case 
R., pp.39-41; Grand Theft Case R., pp.40-42.) 
On or about December 21, 2006,~ acting pro se, Mr. Hartshorn timely filed a 
motion, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, requesting sentence reductions in all four of 
his cases.6 (Drug Case R., pp.64-74, 79.) Accompanying his motion was new 
The file stamp on Mr. Hartshorn's motion indicates that it was filed on December 33, 
2006. (See Drug Case R., p.64.) However, this appears to be an error since December 
had only 31 days in 2006. 
Mr. Hartshorn's motion indicates that it was signed and dated on December 21, 
2006. (See Drug Case R., p.74.) In addition, the certificate of service indicates that it 
was served upon the prosecutor on that date as well. (See Drug Case R., p.74.) 
Although the motion wasclearly related to all four cases (see Drug Case R., p.64), it 
only appears in the Clerk's Record for the Drug Case. Notably, its pages are out of 
order in the Clerk's record in that case. (See Drug Case R., pp.64-74, 79.) 
information. (See Drug Case R., pp.65-68 (handwritten statement from Mr. Hartshorn 
asserting his innocence as to the bad check and grand theft charges, accepting 
responsibility for his escape from custody, and indicating a desire to participate in 
inpatient substance abuse treatment), 69-71 (police reports which Mr. Hartshorn asserts 
support his innocence claims), 72 (photocopy of a debit card and numerous 
identification cards), 73 (letter evidencing Mr. Hartshorn's attempts to procure funding 
for substance abuse treatment).)' 
On January 22, 2007, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 
motion. (See generally Drug Case R., pp.80-81; Escape Case R., pp.34-35; Bad Check 
Case R., pp.49-50; Grand Theft Case R., pp.48-49; Rule 35 Tr., p.5, L . l  - p.13, L.2.) At 
that hearing, Mr. Hartshorn was represented by his counsel of record. (See generally 
Drug Case R., pp.80-81; Escape Case R., pp.34-35; Bad Check Case R., pp.49-50; 
Grand Theft Case R., pp.48-49; Rule 35 Tr., p.5, L.l - p.13, L.2.) Ultimately, the district 
court denied Mr. Hartshorn's motion as to each of his four sentences. (Drug Case R., 
p.80; Escape Case R., p.34; Bad Check Case R., p.49; Grand Theft Case R., p.48; Rule 
35 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-6.) The following day, it issued a written order memorializing that 
decision. (Drug Case R., p.82.) 
On October I, 2007, Mr. Hartshorn, once again acting pro se, filed a Motion to 
Withdraw Alford Plea, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea in the Grand Theft Case. (See 
Nevertheless, at the hearing on Mr. Hartshorn's motion, the State ended up arguing 
that "this is a rehash. There's no new information here." (Rule 35 Tr., p.8, Ls.10-11.) 
The district court agreed with the State in this regard, stating: "I don't think there's any 
real new information here." (Rule 35 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7.) 
generally Motion to Withdraw Alford plea.)' In support of his motion, Mr. Hartshorn 
asserted that, among other things: he was innocent of the charged offense because, 
although he certainly possessed the financial transaction card in question, he thought 
he had authorization to possess and use it and, thus, acted without the intent to 
appropriate the card for himself or to deprive its owner of it (Motion to Withdraw Alford 
Plea, pp.3, 4, 7); his plea had been involuntarily given insofar as he "was told that if he 
didn't plead guilty to grand theft he was to be charged with the persistent violator" 
(Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea, p.2); he was never "told that the state had the burden 
of proving intent" (Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea, p 6); and he appeared for his 
December 18, 2006, sentencing hearing fully expecting his December 7, 2006, motion 
to withdraw his pleas to be heard at that time, but was persuaded by his attorney to 
withdraw that motion and proceed to sentencing immediately (Motion to Withdraw Alford 
Plea, pp 6, 8). 
On February 12, 2008, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Hartshorn's Motion 
to Withdraw Alford Plea. (See generally Minute ~ntry'; Withdrawal of Plea Tr.) At that 
hearing, Mr. Hartshorn appeared by telephone and was forced to argue on his own 
behalf, as no counsel was present to represent him. (See generally Minute Entry; 
Withdrawal of Plea Tr.) At the end of the hearing, the district court sought to clarify 
Mr. Hartshorn's argument: 
THE COURT: 
As discussed in note 3, supra, the Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea is attached to 
Mr. Hartshorn's Motion to Augment Record, which is filed concurrently herewith. 
The Minute Entry pertaining to the February 12, 2008, hearing on Mr. Hartshorn's 
Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea is attached to Mr. Hartshorn's Motion to Augment 
Record, which is filed concurrently herewith 
I just want to make sure I understand your position regarding the 
facts. If I understand it, you entered into the plea agreement sometime in 
November, I think, November 22d of 2006, and pursuant to that plea 
agreement pled guilty, probably roughly the same time. 
After the entry of the plea of guilty, you had a change of heart for 
the reasons you've explained today and filed a motion to withdraw your 
guilty plea, which you felt was scheduled to be heard when you were 
brought up, I'm guessing December 18th of 2006? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: At the time you were brought up, you believe that 
you received some inaccurate information andlor representations from 
your attorney, and based on those inaccurate representations, agreed to 
withdraw your motion to withdraw your guilty plea, which you had 
previously filed, and to proceed to sentencing, based on a presentence 
report that had been prepared in the earlier case. 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: So the substance, and I want to make sure I 
understand, the substance of your argument is that the bad advice given 
you by your attorney, you feel that based on that advice you didn't act in a 
knowing, voluntary and informed manner. 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: Is there anything I've overlooked in that summary? I 
know it's brief, but I'm trying to get to the substance of your claim. 
THE DEFENDANT: No. You pretty much got it 
(Withdrawal of Plea Tr., p.24, L.15 - p.25, L.22.) The district court then took the 
matter under advisement. (Withdrawal of Plea Tr., p.25, L.24 - p.26, L.1.) 
On March 20, 2008, the district court entered an order denying Mr. Hartshorn's 
motion to withdraw his plea, as well as separate memorandum decision setting forth the 
district court's reasoning. (Order re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and Objection to 
Memorandum Decision; Memorandum Decision re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and 
Objection to Memorandum Decision, pp.3-14.)" 
In the meantime, on January 25, 2007, Mr. Hartshorn, acting pro se, had filed 
notices of appeal in all four of his cases. (Drug Case R., pp.84-88; Escape Case R., 
pp.36-40; Bad Check Case R., pp.51-55; Grand Theft Case R., pp.50-54.) Those 
notices are timely from the order revoking Mr. Hartshorn's probation in the Drug Case, 
the judgments of conviction in Mr. Hartshorn's other three cases, the district court's 
denial of the Rule 35 motions that had been filed in all four cases, and, of course, the 
eventual denial of the motion to withdraw Mr. Hartshorn's guilty plea in the Grand Theft 
Case. On appeal, Mr. Hartshorn contends that the district court denied him his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea where defense counsel was not present. He further contends that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motions. Mr. Hartshorn respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw 
his plea in the Grand Theft Case and that it remand his case for a new hearing on that 
motion. He also requests that this Court reduce his sentences. 
'O The Order re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and Objection to Memorandum 
Decision and the Memorandum Decision re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and 
Objection to Memorandum Decision, which together also denied another motion filed by 
Mr. Hartshorn (a motion to reconsider the district court's order denying Mr. Hartshorn's 
motion for credit for time served) which is not at issue in the present appeal, are both 
attached to Mr. Hartshorn's Motion to Augment Record, which is filed concurrently 
herewith. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court deny Mr. Hartshorn his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by 
holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea where defense 
counsel was not present? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 
motion? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Denied Mr. Hartshorn His Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel By 
Holding A Hearing On The Motion To Withdraw His Guiltv Plea Where Defense Counsel 
Was Not Present 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made obligatory upon 
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 
counsel. " Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). "The right of one charged with 
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some 
countries, but it is in ours." Id. at 344. 
This right to counsel extends to all critical stages in the criminal justice process. 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); see also U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 
(1967) ("The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel's assistance 
whenever necessary to assure a meaningful 'defense."'). A motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is such a "critical stage in the direct criminal proceeding against the defendant at 
which the accused must be entitled to effective assistance of counsel." Padgett v. 
State, 743 So.2d 70, 72-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); accord United States v. Davis, 
239 F.3d 283, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Garrett, 90 F.3d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Sanchez-Barreto, 93 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1996); United States 
V. White, 659 F.2d 231, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 
1069 (3rd Cir.1976); Marcus v. Fairman, 2000 WL 335700, p.5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 
2000) (unpublished opinion); Berry v. State, 630 So.2d 127, 129 (Ala. Crim. App.1993); 
Lewis v. United States, 446 A.2d 837, 841 (D.C. 1982); People v. Holmes, 297 N.E.2d 
" "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
12 
204, 206 (111. App. Ct. 1973); Marfin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1992); Beals v. State, 802 P.2d 2, 4 (Nev. 1990); Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314, 316 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Browning v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1994). "It cannot be gainsaid that a defendant's guilty plea is the most critical 
stage of the proceeding as it forecloses his very right to a trial. Consequently, in the 
face of an allegedly involuntary plea, a plea withdrawal hearing is vital to ensuring the 
integrity of the process by which guilt may ultimately be determined." Davis, 239 F.3d at 
285-86. 
In light of the fact that the hearing on Mr. Hartshorn's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea was a critical stage of his criminal case, Mr. Hartshorn was clearly entitled to 
the presence of counsel during that hearing." However, Mr. Hartshorn's previously- 
appointed counse~'~ obviously was not present for that hearing.I4 (Court Minutes, p.1; 
Withdrawal of Plea Tr., p.4, L.7.) Accordingly, the district court was strictly precluded 
from proceeding with the hearing without first warning Mr. Hartshorn about the dangers 
of self-representation and obtaining from him a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
l2 The right to counsel is not contingent upon a request by the defendant; rather, "we 
presume that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the 
prosecution." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 & n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1409 & n. 
6, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). 
l3 Mr. Hartshorn had been appointed counsel (the Bonneville County Public Defender's 
Office) in the Grand Theft Case on November 9, 2006, the day after the complaint was 
filed in that case. (Grand Theft Case R., pp.6, 7.) Although, by the time he filed his 
motion to withdraw his plea, the Grand Theft Case was already on appeal and the 
district court had appointed the State Appellate Public Defender to represent 
Mr. Hartshorn on appeal, the district court's order appointing the State Appellate Public 
Defender retained the Bonneville County Public Defender's Office "for all purposes 
other than appeal . . . ." (R., p.61.) 
l4 The record does not disclose why appointed counsel was not present. 
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 835-36 (1975). 
In this case, the district court erred in allowing the hearing on Mr. Hartshorn's 
motion to withdraw his plea to proceed without Mr. Hartshorn having the benefit of 
counsel. The district court should have delayed the hearing until Mr. Hartshorn's 
counsel could be present, sufficiently warned Mr. Hartshorn of the dangers of self- 
representation and inquired whether it was Mr. Hartshorn's desire to proceed pro se, or, 
because one of Mr. Hartshorn's allegations in support of his motion was that no one, not 
even his appointed counsel, had informed him of the intent element of the grand theft 
charge to which he had pled guilty (see Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea, p.6; see also 
Withdrawal of Plea Tr., p.18, Ls. 19-20 ("I don't think my lawyer was 100 percent honest 
with me.")), simply appointed conflict counsel to handle the motion to withdraw the plea. 
II. 
Given The New Information Provided To The District Court In Coniunction With 
Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 Motion, As Well As That Which Had Already Been Presented 
To The District Court At The Time Of His Sentencing Hearinas. It Was An Abuse Of 
Discretion Not To Reduce Mr. Hartshorn's Sentences 
"A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under [Idaho Criminal] Rule 35 is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for 
leniency . . . ." State v. Trenf, 125 Idaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(citation omitted). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant 
must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented 
with the motion for reduction. Id. In this case, Mr. Hartshorn contends that, in view of 
the information available at his original sentencing hearings, as well as the additional 
information presented to the district court in conjunction with his Rule 35 motions, his 
Sentences are excessive. 
It is well-established that a defendant's substance abuse problem, and the part 
that problem has in the commission of the offense, is a mitigating circumstance which 
counsels toward a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Nice, 103 ldaho 89, 91, 
645 P.2d 323, 325 (1982). Mr. Hartshorn, who is now almost 47 years old (see PSI, 
p.l), started using alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine at the tender young age 
of thirteen. (PSI p . . )  He reports that he abused ail three of those drugs for a time. 
(PSI, p.11.) At his 2006 pre-sentence interview, Mr. Hartshorn indicated that he had 
successfully avoided alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine since 2001, but he 
candidly admitted that he has since become addicted to prescription narcotics. (PSI, 
p l . )  This addiction became so bad that he began selling methamphetamine to make 
money to support his prescription pill habit. (PSI, p.2.) Indeed, these actions are what 
led to the offense underlying the Drug Case (PSI, p.2), the first case in Mr. Hartshorn's 
recent bout of legal troubles. Under these circumstances, Mr. Hartshorn was entitled to 
a measure of leniency from the district court. 
It is also well-established that a defendant's desire, not to mention any concrete 
steps he has taken, to overcome his substance abuse problems is another mitigating 
circumstance which counsels toward a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Sfafe v. 
Shideler, 103 ldaho 593, 595, 651 P.2d 527, 529 (1982). Fortunately, Mr. Hartshorn 
acknowledges that he could benefit from treatment. (PSI, p l . )  Indeed, the new 
materials submitted in conjunction with Mr. Hartshorn's Rule 35 motion evidence his 
commitment to treatment, showing that he inquired about state funding for substance 
abuse treatment. (See Drug Case R., p.73.) 
In light of his substance abuse problems and his commitment to turning his life 
around, Mr. Hartshorn submits that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to 
have denied his Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hartshorn respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the 
grand theft charge, and that it remand his case for a new hearing on that motion. He 
also requests that this Court reduce his sentences. 
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